Psychology Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Context, context dependency: sentences, words and texts depend to a varying extent on the addition of additional information to eliminate ambiguities. In particular, the use of index words such as "here", "now", but also of pronouns like "mine" leads to indeterminacy of the reference. The additional information may possibly be taken from an already existing information set, whereby the sentences to be examined, words or texts, form a subset of this more comprehensive set. Such a more comprehensive amount of information already existing elsewhere is called context. See also dependency, ambiguity, indeterminacy, discovery._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Context/Context Dependence - Dictionary of Arguments
II 247 Relativize/contextuality/context-dependent/Field: if the relativization is made explicit, the context dependence (context sensitivity, or dependency of the reference system) is lost. ((s)>complete thought: is Timeless). >Reference systems. E.g. a) "It would be good." b) "It would be good according to my standards." Disquotationally true: may then be a statement that is relativized to my standards. - But no non-relativized evaluative statement can be disquotationally true. >Disquotation, >Disquotationalism, >Tarski-scheme._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments in relation to Context/Context Dependence
